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Abstract 
The present article presents securitization theory and applies it to energy 
policy in Latin America. The article's focus is on how the Brazilian State 
marginalizes tribal land claims by securitizing energy production in order to 
pursue so-called development projects in the energy sector. This practice 
occurs via the utilization of a procedural instrument known as ‘Security 
Suspension’, the origins and consequences of which are examined in this 
work. The research suggests that contrary to what is affirmed by the State, 
this securitization does not benefit the population at large, which raises a 
question as to why these projects are really being carried out. While a 
plethora of tribal peoples’ human rights are violated by this practice that 
perpetuates a policy directed at the marginalization of these minorities, the 
interest of the majority of the population in the preservation of the 
environment is sidelined. 
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Resumo 
O presente artigo apresenta a teoria da securitização e a aplica à política 
energética na América Latina. O trabalho foco em como o Estado brasileiro 
marginaliza reivindicações das terras tribais ao securitizar a produção 
energética com o objetivo de perseguir o assim chamado projeto de 
desenvolvimento no setor energético. Essa prática ocorre via uso de um 
instrumento procedimental conhecido como “Suspensão de Segurança”, 
cujas origens e consequências são examinadas neste trabalho. A pesquisa 
sugere que, ao contrário do que é afirmado pelo Estado, essa securitização 
não beneficia a população como um todo, o que levanta a questionamentos 
sobre a razão pela qual esses projetos estão realmente sendo levados a 
cabo. Enquanto uma miríade de direitos humanos das populações tribais 
sãoviolados por essa prática que perpetua uma política direcionada à 
marginalização dessas minorias, o interesse da maioria da população na 
preservação do meio-ambiente é deixado de lado. 
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“The dominant discourse, a universalist and competent discourse that 
excluded indigenous societies throughout history, idealized and naturalized 
cultural differences sometimes as barbarians and savages, sometimes as 
romantic and folkloric, but, always, and especially, as obstacles to the 
integration, unification and development of the State.” (Justice Antonio Souza 
Prudente in §1st Federal Regional Tribunal of Brazil, 2012) 
The dynamics of energy policy securitization in Brazil and the consequences for tribal peoples 2 
 
Homa Publica - Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos e Empresas | 2526-0774 | Vol. 01 Nº 01 | Jun-Nov 2016 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2014 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter ‘Commission’ or 
‘IACHR’) held a thematic hearing on a Brazilian legal instrument know as Security Suspension 
(Suspensão de Segurança)1 and its consequences for the right to access to justice in the country 
(IACHR, 2014). Appearing before the Commission, Brazilian tribal representatives2 accompanied by 
national and international NGOs reported the rights violations caused by the state’s utilization of the 
instrument. Demonstrating that the instrument allows the government to render ineffective judicial 
decisions that seek to guarantee tribal peoples’ rights, their claims endeavoured to expose that 
Security Suspension perpetuates the dynamics of oppression between a repressive state and 
marginalized traditional groups (see IACHR, 2014; and AIDA et al, 2014b). The Brazilian State, in turn, 
submitted that the instrument was key to guaranteeing democratic interests in the face of ill-advised 
judicial decisions (see IACHR, 2014; and Brasil, 2014a).  
A telling account of how the opposing parties regard the utilization of the legal instrument, 
the discussion before the Commission briefly reveals the existence of an underlying dynamic of 
securitization of energy production and a resulting marginalization of tribal land claims in Brazil. The 
present article intends to analyse this dynamic in detail, demonstrating how and why this 
securitization occurs and what its consequences are. Such analysis can be of fundamental importance 
in order to expose the inadequacy and dangers of the official discourse and how it is used to violate 
the human rights of groups that are historically oppressed in Brazil. This research will tackle the issue 
by focusing on energy production projects regarded by the government as crucial for the 
development of the country. As will be demonstrated, the conclusion reached through the analysis 
of these projects can be extended, mutatis mutandi, to other projects considered important for the 
country’s economic progress, such as transport infrastructure projects.  
By looking at national and international norms, judicial decisions and opinions and official and 
non-governmental reports, this article is structured as follows: the first section briefly explains the 
concept of securitization and its application to the circumstances in Brazil and throughout Latin 
America; the second section considers the origin and nature of the legal instrument known as Security 
Suspension and how it is used to securitize energy production and marginalize tribal land claims; the 
following section analyses some of the consequences of this policy, demonstrating several of the 
violations of tribal peoples’ rights that result from the use of Security Suspension; the final section 
takes stock of the previous ones and concludes that the reason for the utilization of this legal 
instrument is far from what was put forward by the Brazilian State during the thematic meeting 
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The article concludes that by securitizing 
energy production, thereby prioritizing so-called development projects over tribal land claims, the 
public interest is sidelined while political parties and private businesses engage in an undemocratic 
exchange of favours. 
                                                                
1
 This legal instrument has been translated as “Suspension of Security” by some and “Security Suspension” by others. While the 
difference highlights the ambiguity of the name in Portuguese, the authors believe that “Security Suspension” is a more 
accurate translation of the name in keeping with the intention of the instrument’s creators. 
2
 For the purposes of the present essay the word ‘tribal’ will encompass indigenous and tribal peoples as their rights arising 
from ILO Convention 169 are one and the same and this author agrees with the position that the same should apply for the 
Brazilian Constitution (see AIDA et al, 2014a). 
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2. SECURITIZATION THEORY AND ENERGY PRODUCTION IN LATIN 
AMERICA 
Emanating from the field of international relations and security studies, and more particularly 
the Copenhagen School, securitization theory is based on the notion that political or other actors seek 
to prioritise certain issues by deeming them matters of security or “existential threats” to security, in 
order to place these issues outside the normal political structure (Buzan et al, 1998: 21-29). By 
treating certain issues as extraordinary matters which threaten the life of the state, future welfare or 
another matter of similar importance, these actors look to cast off the restrictions imposed upon 
them by the legal and political systems. According to the proponents of securitization theory, the 
decision to treat an issue as an existential threat is a subjective one and not based on objectively-
ascertainable conditions; therefore, the actors seeking to securitize a particular issue must convince 
the referent audience(s) that the issue in question does indeed pose an existential threat to 
something of fundamental importance to society if the securitization is to be successful (Buzan 25; 
31; see also, Olesker, 2014: 373). If the securitization is successful, the actors may then resort to 
extraordinary measures, such as violating international law or restricting civil liberties, as well as 
allocating increased resources to the issue.  
Professor Jenny Pearce links securitization theory to the writings of philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben (Pearce, 2011: 299-300). Agamben argues that the voluntary creation of a permanent state 
of exception has become one of the essential practices of states, with democracies increasingly 
achieving this not by declaring a state of emergency, but by employing the security paradigm as the 
principal technique of government (Agamben 2005: 2-30). One of the key characteristics of this 
paradigm is the elimination of the distinction between legislative, executive and judicial powers (7), 
and once this becomes the rule rather than the exception, the juridico-political system becomes “a 
killing machine” (86). Agamben considers the use of this practise to have become practically universal: 
Indeed, the state of exception has today reached its maximum worldwide deployment. The 
normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a 
governmental violence that— while ignoring international law externally and producing a 
permanent state of exception internally—nevertheless still claims to be applying the law 
(87).  
The “War on Drugs” provides us with an example of successful securitization, first 
domestically and then internationally, of an issue – the need to tackle the allegedly existential threat 
posed to society/public order in many states by the production and consumption of certain drugs. The 
first laws prohibiting drugs in the United States outlawed opium, targeting Chinese workers who were 
seen as a threat to white labour and the dominant white majority in general (Bewley-Taylor, 1999, p. 
17). The public association of certain drugs with ethnic and other minorities persisted throughout the 
early twentieth century; cocaine was said to make blacks violent and sexually uncontrollable, Hindus 
were said to encourage Cannabis addiction, and marijuana was associated with Mexicans involved in 
criminal activities (Campbell, 1992, p. 180). These drugs have all been incorporated into the U.S. 
prohibitionist regime, while tobacco and alcohol (other than the period from 1920-33) have not. This 
is in spite of the fact that alcohol and tobacco related deaths greatly outnumber those caused by 
consumption of illegal drugs (Campbell, 1992, p. 176).  
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Campbell links the discourse used by anti-communist crusaders in the U.S. to that used by 
those promoting the prohibition of certain drugs, pointing out that what was really at stake was the 
"endangered nature of the ethical boundaries of identity" (Campbell, 1992, p. 176). That is to say, the 
threat from drugs in the U.S. has been perceived and portrayed as something external in origin even 
when tackling the issue domestically, with "foreign" substances and behaviour, as opposed to the 
behaviour of the dominant group, being used to highlight the difference between the "normal" and 
the "pathological" (Campbell, 1992, p. 184). The questionable prioritization of certain drugs for 
prohibition is an example of the subjective nature of the move to securitize the issue. Seeking to 
convince the referent audience, i.e. the white majority, by focusing on the threat posed by the 
behaviour of minorities demonstrates how securitization can exclude groups from society. 
Although the issue of tackling the alleged threat posed by the drugs mentioned above was 
successfully securitized domestically, initial U.S. efforts to internationalize the prohibition on opium 
smoking were met with resistance, particularly from the British who benefitted economically from 
the opium trade. Thus, while the issue of drug prohibition was successfully securitized domestically, 
it took the United Sates some time to convince the referent audience – the international community 
– of the existential threat presented internationally by drug production and consumption (Bewley-
Taylor, 1999, p. 22-25). However, these efforts were ultimately successful. According to the preamble 
of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, “…addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a 
serious evil for the individual and is fraught with economic and social danger to mankind” (United 
Nations, 1961). The inclusion of such melodramatic language in an international treaty represented a 
successful international securitization of the issue and its almost universal adoption was confirmation 
of this.  
Although different approaches have been taken to tackle the negative impact of addiction to 
those drugs that have been incorporated into the prohibitionist regime, the fact that it has been 
widely accepted to represent an existential threat has permitted many states to adopt extreme 
means that would not usually be permissible. The consequences of the securitization of tackling drug 
addiction have been dramatic and their effect on human rights cannot be understated. These include 
the increasing militarisation of law enforcement leading to unprecedented levels of violence in 
various countries, including many in Latin America, and this has led to extrajudicial executions, 
enforced disappearances and a startling increase in incarceration rates (Centre for Legal and Social 
Studies – CELS, 2015, pp. 10-13; 37-39).  
Pearce argues that the role played by Latin American states in fomenting violence generates 
political capital for the state and that high levels of violence are not a result of institutional weakness, 
but a new perverse form of state (Pearce pp. 295-297). In this perverse form of state, “internal ‘wars’ 
with violent youth, drug traffickers, and the remaining insurgent forces in the region” legitimize 
states (299). This brings us to a final key characteristic often present in securitization which applies in 
equal measure to the securitization of energy production and that of narcotics production and 
consumption. By successfully securitizing an issue, the State in practice often seeks to create a 
category of “non-citizens” who are stripped of their rights and can be subjected to the pure violence 
of the state (Pearce 299). In the “War on Drugs”, the groups excluded from societal order include 
young men in marginalized areas with a large organized crime presence and rural communities 
involved in the cultivation of certain crops for their own subsistence, while the securitization of 
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energy production excludes tribal peoples whose efforts to defend and exercise their fundamental 
rights are deemed to negatively impact upon the rights of the majority and public order. To further 
illustrate the point and the link between securitization theory and states of exception, it is worth 
noting that Agamben points to the erasure of the legal status of the Jews in the Nazi labor camps and 
those indefinitely held captive in Guantanamo as examples of those placed outside the law when the 
juridical order is suspended (Agamben 2005: 3-4). 
The Copenhagen School asserts that securitizing an issue is effectively an admittance of 
failure, an acceptance that normal politics cannot address the matter at hand (Buzan et al, 1998: 29). 
While accepting that taking the political decision to securitize an issue could be unavoidable in certain 
circumstances (e.g. when facing an "implacable or barbarian aggressor") or tactically advantageous 
(e.g. in order to raise awareness regarding environmental problems), the Copenhagen School believes 
that desecuritization should always be the long-term goal (Ibid). Of course, there are alternative 
critical security theories and the Copenhagen School has received criticism. For example, Floyd 
purports that desecuritization does not necessarily return an issue to the realm of normal politics and 
she points to the international ban on landmines and the creation of the International Criminal Court 
as examples of securitization with positive consequences (Floyd, 2007: 43-45). This article does not 
seek to contribute to this broader debate, instead limiting itself to applying securitization theory 
analysis to the issue of energy production and other so-called development projects. 
The authors of the present article find the relation between securitization theory and the 
governmental technique of creating a permanent state of exception particularly pertinent to the 
subject at hand. Successfully securitizing an issue permits the securitizing actor to suspend the 
political and juridical rules that apply to that particular issue, thereby creating a bubble of exception, 
set apart from the rest of the legal and political system which continues to operate as usual to the 
extent possible, within which extraordinary measures can be taken to address what has subjectively 
been identified as an “existential threat”. Depending on how they are framed and the level of 
acceptance they achieve from the referent audience, these bubbles of exception can swell in size and 
they can endure for lengthy periods. Of course, the main difference between a state of exception and 
securitization theory is that the former is declaratory or decisionist in nature – i.e. it comes into being 
upon being declared by the state – whereas the securitizing actor must convince the referent 
audience for a successful securitization (see Olesker, 2014: pp. 374-375; Williams, 2003: 517-518).  
The authors believe that the Brazilian legal instrument of Security Suspension has elements 
of both of these theories. As will be explained later, it was created during a state of exception, but its 
successful implementation by the Executive requires the acquiescence of the Judiciary. Hence, the 
Judiciary is the referent audience. Although the Judiciary is an autonomous power of the republic, 
the Executive wields significant influence in the pattern of promotion in the higher courts and this 
dynamic is reflected in the lower courts￼ (see more on this issue on pages 20-22). Therefore, we have 
elements of a state of exception where the distinction between powers is blurred and power is 
concentrated in the hands of the Executive. There are also elements of securitization theory evident, 
with the political actor availing of Security Suspension as the securitizing actor, the Judiciary as the 
referent audience, the tribal peoples who own the land as the excluded group and the suspension of 
judicial decisions for security reasons, and consequent rights violations, the extraordinary measures 
permitted to avert the existential threat posed by obstacles to energy production.  
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Buzan and Wæver argue that regions play an important part in defining the structure of 
international security (460). Before we turn to examine Security Suspension, let us first briefly 
consider the matter of securitization of energy production elsewhere in Latin America, which forms 
part of a wider pattern of securitization of “development” or economic progress. This article will not 
undertake a country-by-country analysis of this issue, but briefly analyzing a couple of examples 
should help us to identify a securitizing trend in the region. 
The reform of the energy sector will form an important part of Mexican President Enrique 
Peña Nieto’s dubious human rights legacy. A constitutional reform which came into force in December 
2013 (Mexico, 2013) paved the way for a packet of reforms – nine pieces of secondary legislation were 
passed and 12 more were amended – which sought to open up the energy sector, particularly the oil 
and gas industries, to private and foreign investment. Although the reform was well-received by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (IMF, 2014), the Inter-American Development Bank (El Economista, 
2014) and others, human rights organisations were alarmed at its potential impact on human rights. 
Among their initial concerns was the wording of Transitional Article3 8 of the Constitutional Reform, 
which they said would result in human rights violations (Red TDT, 2015: p. 30). This article states that 
the exploration and extraction of petroleum and other hydrocarbons are strategic in nature and are 
therefore of “public utility” and of “social interest and public order”, and it gives such activities 
preference over all others either on or below the surface (Mexico, 2013: Transitional Article 8). 
Transitional Article 8 paved the way for the inclusion of a pathway in the legislative measures that 
followed for the de facto expropriation of land where an actor from the extractive industry who 
wishes to use the property cannot reach an agreement with the owner(s) (See, CEMDA, 2014: pp. 16-
18). Indigenous and other rural communities, already among the most marginalised groups in Mexico, 
appear likely to be denied their rights as a result of these reforms, and the power imbalance between 
these actors and the companies involved in the extractive industry will be further skewed by the 
shadow of expropriation looming over any negotiations (see, for example, Montalvo, 2014 and 
CartoCrítica, 2014).  
Pearce argues that some Latin American states are often geared to respond violently to 
protect the interests of elites rather than govern in the name of the people (301). In Mexico, where 
“the strategies of state and criminal violence facilitate new mechanisms of social control and the 
depoliticization of civil society through terror” (Red TDT, 2015: 28), certain elite groups dominate 
political life and constitute the relevant referent audiences that must be persuaded for the successful 
securitization of an issue. The fact that the Executive managed to obtain the consent of both houses 
of parliament to pass the energy reform, thereby elevating both public and private extractive industry 
activities above all others, must be regarded as at least a partially successful securitization of the 
issue of energy production. The widespread approval the reform was met with in the international 
community and in the mainstream Mexican media confirms that the securitization was indeed 
successful. 
After a lengthy drafting process and a referendum, the Bolivian Constitution was 
promulgated in 2009. Although it has been heralded for its progressive norms on the environment, 
                                                                
3
 In Mexican constitutional reform, transitional articles are similar to directives insofar as they fill the gap between the reform 
and existing law, as well as providing direction on the reform and/or creation of secondary laws. 
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indigenous rights, the right to water and democratic participation, among others (see Amparo 
Rodríguez, 2012: 31-37), it also states that activities related to the exploitation of non-renewable 
resources have the character of “state necessity and public utility” (Bolivia, 2009: Article 356). Perez 
Castellón puts this ambiguity down to the unresolved debate over the development model to be 
implemented in Bolivia, with the government seeking to prioritise extractive and infrastructure 
projects, whereas certain indigenous groups from the highlands and lowlands favour an alternative 
model that respects nature and indigenous peoples’ rights (Pérez Castellón, 2013: pp. 8-9).  
The use of the term “public utility” in both the Mexican constitutional reform and the actual 
text of the Bolivian Constitution is no accident. Both instruments seek to justify the expropriation of 
land for the purposes of the exploitation of non-renewable resources. Article 21 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ACHR) establishes the right to property, but it also sets out 
the reasons for which this right may be restricted: “No one shall be deprived of his property except 
upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and 
according to the forms established by law [emphasis added]” (Organization of the American States, 
1969: Article 21[2]). Pérez Callejón argues that characterizing extractive activities as of public utility 
in the Bolivian Constitution is an attempt to elude the requirement under Bolivian law that each 
declaration of public utility be clearly and coherently justified in a specially-drafted piece of 
legislation (Pérez Callejón, 2014). As in the Mexican Energy Reform, this gives such activities absolute 
preference over all others and legally facilitates expropriation. 
Given the political intricacies and multiple points of debate involved in the constitutional 
reform process, a thorough analysis of the characterization of the exploitation of non-renewable 
resources as of public utility would be a difficult task and would go beyond the scope of the article. 
However, it is possible to reach several preliminary conclusions in this respect. Firstly, the use of the 
term “public utility” is intended to justify the suspension of the right to property. Economic 
advancement is the goal of this measure and anything perceived as an obstacle to progress would be 
seen as a threat to a “state necessity”. Declarations by President Morales that consultations with 
indigenous peoples “waste a lot of time” and that it was therefore necessary to modify the law in 
order to speed up investment shed light on the Bolivian Government’s priorities (Datos, 2015). This 
discourse and the suspension of indigenous peoples’ rights and the right to property will inevitably 
impact most severely upon indigenous peoples in possession of the land where extractive projects 
are to be carried out.  
In both Mexico and Bolivia the Executive power has changed the law to give extractive 
activities priority over all others. The justification given for these changes is that extractive activities 
are essential for development to be achieved. This understanding of development fails to consider 
the internationally agreed characteristics of the right to development as set out in the UN Declaration 
on the Right to Development, which recognizes the right of peoples to self-determination and 
explicitly states that "all human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent" 
(UN, 1986: Articles 1(2) and 6(2). In addition, this prioritization fails to take into account the concerns 
regarding the extractive model of development which are shared by many (see, for example, Red TDT, 
2015). Any obstacles to this vision of development are seen as barriers to progress, with negative 
consequences for the population as a whole.  This discourse seeks to justify the extraordinary 
measure of expropriation of land, thereby restricting property and tribal rights, among others. We 
The dynamics of energy policy securitization in Brazil and the consequences for tribal peoples 8 
 
Homa Publica - Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos e Empresas | 2526-0774 | Vol. 01 Nº 01 | Jun-Nov 2016 
will now discuss how this trend is characterized in Brazil, through the suspension of judicial decisions 
handed down for the protection of the rights of those facing the adverse impact of large 
“development” projects. We argue that the projects being protected by the use of Security 
Suspension benefit certain elites rather than a populace as a whole. To examine whether the same is 
true of the projects being carried out in the name of development and to the detriment of 
marginalized rural communities in Mexico, Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America would be a useful 
exercise but is beyond the scope of this article. 
3. THE TOOL FOR TRIBAL LANDS SECURITIZATION  
It is important to look into the context under which Suspension of Security was created, as it 
can be regarded as indicative of its nature. The legal instrument came into existence in a period 
appropriately identified by the NGOs and tribal peoples that took the matter to the Commission as a 
state of exception in Brazil (AIDA et al, 2014b: 5). By the time the instrument was passed into law in 
1936, Brazil was ruled by Getúlio Vargas, who came to power via a coup d’etat in 1930 and held onto 
it until 1945. Before the IACHR the representatives of the Brazilian State claimed the instrument was 
passed into law under a democratic regime, since Vargas was confirmed into power via elections held 
in 1934 (IACHR, 2014). However, these representatives failed to mention the fact that these elections 
were indirect and considered by the Superior Electoral Tribunal (2012) as breaking with the 
democratic traditions of the country. Also absent in the representatives’ discourse was the fact that 
Vargas perpetrated another coup in 1937, demonstrating the instability and lack of democratic 
guarantees of the period. 
Going beyond this contextual examination of the origins of Security Suspension, an analysis 
of the characteristics and evolution of the instrument demonstrates its undemocratic nature. The 
instrument was first created so as allow for the suspension of the execution of preliminary or 
interlocutory injunctions awarded by judges in certain limited circumstances where the decision was 
determined to go against the public interest. Specifically, the instrument could be used to suspend 
injunctions awarded, through the implementation of Mandado de Segurança (hereinafter ‘MS’) (See 
Brasil, 1936), by lower court judges. MS is a legal instrument that is somewhat similar to the 
instrument of amparo, which exists in many other Latin American jurisdictions and enables individuals 
to protect their rights against manifestly illegal acts of public officials (AIDA et al, 2014b: 5). As long 
as these injunctions were considered to threaten the public interest, their effect could be suspended 
by the president of a superior court until the judge of the lower court or the appeals court chamber 
reached a final decision on the merits of the case (see Brasil, 1936). In 1936, only those decisions that 
were considered a threat to public order, health and security were subject to suspension via the 
utilization of the instrument (Brasil, 1936: art. 13).  
In 1964, during yet another state of exception in Brazil characterized by a military 
dictatorship, the instrument was expanded so that it could suspend the effectiveness of decisions 
that were regarded as a threat to the public economy (see Brasil, 1964). In 1992, the instrument was 
expanded even further, allowing it to be utilized against judicial decisions emanating from any kind 
of lawsuits and not only those related to MS petitions (see Brasil, 1992). While Security Suspension 
was first idealized as an instrument that aimed to preserve the public interest when challenged by 
individual claims, this last mutation of the instrument allowed it to suspend decisions seeking to 
The dynamics of energy policy securitization in Brazil and the consequences for tribal peoples 9 
 
Homa Publica - Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos e Empresas | 2526-0774 | Vol. 01 Nº 01 | Jun-Nov 2016 
preserve collective rights as well (see AIDA et al, 2014b: 5). With the 1992 reform, not only preliminary 
or interlocutory injunctions awarded by the lower courts but also by the appeals courts could be 
suspended.  
In 2001 the instrument underwent its most recent reform with the adoption of a Provisional 
Measure allowing public officials to utilize it to request the suspension of any decision of lower courts 
and appeal chambers, even those that judged upon the merits of the case, for as long as these 
decisions could be appealed (see Brasil, 2001; and AIDA et al, 2014b:5). In 2009 a new law regulating 
the MS instrument was promulgated, but none of these characteristics were modified (Brasil, 2009). 
The jurisprudence, however, has expanded the range of actors that can require the suspension of 
judicial decisions to include private companies that provide public services (see, e.g., 1st Federal 
Regional Tribunal, 2015). 
The aforementioned attributes of Security Suspension demonstrate that the instrument 
confers upon state bodies and private actors providing public services powers that do not meet 
democratic standards. These state bodies, represented by public officials, and private companies can 
request the president of courts of appeal to suspend the effectiveness of any judicial decision – as 
long as it can still be appealed - if they subjectively consider it to pose a threat to one of a broad 
spectrum of public interests. It should be recalled that in Brazil the executive branch of the 
government has a strong influence in the promotion of members of the judiciary. The practice of 
exchanging promotions for the suspension of decisions has been reported by members of the Federal 
Prosecutor’s Office during meetings of a working group with a mandate to combat the consequences 
of Security Suspension4. In contravention of both Article 8 of the ACHR and the UN Human Rights 
Committee General Comment n. 32 that provides for the independence and impartiality of judicial 
systems (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2007: para 19; see also IACHR, 2013: 10-11), 
Security Suspension allows the executive branch to exert pressure upon members of the judiciary 
when projects considered a priority by the government are threatened by a judicial decision (see AIDA 
et al, 2014b: 25).  
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of parliamentary democracy which 
ensures that there are checks in place to prevent too much power from becoming concentrated in 
one branch of government. Effectively enabling public officials to suspend judicial decisions based on 
their subjective assertion that such decisions are not in the public interest has the effect of eroding 
an important check on power. While in theory the fact that a higher court judge must agree to carry 
out a suspension may help to prevent abuse, the dependence of these very judicial officials on the 
other branches of government tend to make gaining judicial approval a foregone conclusion. As will 
be shown later, the suspension of decisions handed down to protect individual or collective rights in 
cases involving the construction of dams or other large development projects is hugely significant. 
The legal process all the way up to the final appeal takes years. Allowing construction and other works 
to proceed even after a judge has ordered their suspension or cancellation based on the merits of the 
case provides the government with an incentive to delay the case whenever possible and has the 
ultimate effect of nullifying the right to challenge projects such as these in court. 
                                                                
4
 Working group meeting records of December 18, 2013 [File with the author]. 
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The abovementioned undemocratic characteristics of Security Suspension indicate how the 
instrument can be easily utilized in order to securitize the production of energy at the expense of 
tribal land claims in Brazil. Following a recent country visit, the UN Working Group on Business and 
Human Rights voiced the concern that "[security suspension] appears to be a disproportionate 
instrument, the use of which could pit the power of the federal State against affected communities." 
(United Nations Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises, 2016, p. 13 § 44). The following examples will serve to demonstrate this 
in detail. They exhibit how the government uses the instrument to advance a political discourse that 
perpetuates an historical pattern of oppression of tribal peoples. The examples also show that the 
acceptance and reproduction of said discourse via Security Suspension decisions by the judiciary can 
be regarded as successful securitization of energy production resulting in the marginalization of tribal 
land claims.  
An emblematic Security Suspension decision is SL125 ruled by then president of the Brazilian 
Supreme Tribunal (also “STF”), Justice Ellen Gracie. On this occasion, Justice Ellen was called upon by 
the Union, represented by the Attorney General of the Republic, to determine whether a decision 
from a federal appeals court should be suspended or not. After analysing an interlocutory appeal, the 
appeals court had ruled that the construction of the Belo Monte Dam should be suspended, as 
indigenous communities whose lands would be impacted by the construction had not been consulted 
before the project received congressional approval (see STF, 2007). By not consulting these peoples, 
the state had violated a procedural human right (i.e. the right to free, prior and informed consultation) 
that served as a guarantee for avoiding further tribal human rights violations that could result from 
such a project (see AIDA et al, 2014a: 16-29). 
Belo Monte was the biggest so-called development project under way in the country and 
claimed by the government to be the third largest dam in the world (see Jaichand and Sampaio, 2013: 
409-411; also Aneel). Before the Supreme Court, the government alleged that stopping the project 
would threaten public order and the economy, two of the concepts that justify the utilization of 
Security Suspension (see STF, 2007). In setting out its argument, the government advanced a 
securitizing discourse with two principal and cumulative components. Firstly, it claimed that halting 
the project would severely compromise an energy policy that was of vital importance for the 
implementation of public policy that was in the public interest (see STF, 2007). Secondly, the 
government claimed that, if it was not allowed to carry on with the project, sixteen other dams would 
have to be constructed so as to implement the abovementioned public policy, which would result in 
more public spending and the flooding of an area fourteen times the size of the one to be affected 
by Belo Monte, thereby expanding the harmful environmental and related effects (see STF, 2007). In 
sum, the project was in the interest of the general public and stopping it would result in monetary 
and environmental losses.  
Aside from the monetary and environmental aspects, at that time the government did not 
elaborate on what it considered this ‘public interest’ to be. However, it did so when precautionary 
measures were sought before the IACHR for alleged human rights violations arising from the 
construction of the dam. Before the Commission the government alleged the dam was necessary for 
the accomplishment of fundamental objectives set out in the Constitution, such as the promotion of 
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human dignity, elimination of extreme poverty, national development and the reduction of social 
inequality (Jaichand and Sampaio, 2013: 410).  
By claiming that the construction of Belo Monte was a matter of public interest on the basis 
of the state’s fundamental objectives as detailed in the Constitution, the government painted the 
picture as one of survival of its social democratic values, all of which it portrayed as being dependent 
on economic progress. This portrayal is undoubtedly that of an existential threat as these values 
compose the very identity of the nation. By utilizing Security Suspension to frame a decision 
suspending the project as a threat to said values, the government sought to securitize the issue by 
convincing the referent audience, i.e. the judiciary as the guarantor of Constitutional values5, of the 
existential nature of the threat posed. It is clear that when doing so, the government failed to 
consider other fundamental values that compose the identity of the nation, such as respect for and 
celebration of cultural diversity, which are not dependent on economic progress (see, e.g., Brasil, 
1988: art. 215).  
As tribal peoples’ rights are inextricably interconnected with the preservation of their land 
rights (see Jaichand and Sampaio, 2013: 414-415), respect for and celebration of cultural diversity 
would entail abstaining from pursuing projects that could bring about a substantial impact to these 
territories (see IACHR, 2009: para 330; and AIDA et al, 2014a: 25-26). Hence, excluding the values 
related to cultural diversity from the national identity makes it clear that the securitization discourse 
utilized by the government is to the detriment of the tribal peoples’ land claims in Brazil. During the 
thematic meeting before the Commission, tribal peoples and NGOs demonstrated a pattern of 
utilization of this discourse, with the government drawing the attention of the judiciary to the alleged 
grave impacts to public order and the economy if decisions against projects considered key to 
national development were not suspended. This was the case with a complex of more than 100 dams 
projected for the Tapajós basin (AIDA et al, 2014b: 14-20), the Barra Grande Dam (AIDA et al, 2014b: 
21-23) and even the duplication of the Carajás railway that has the sole purpose of transporting and 
exporting iron ore reserves (AIDA et al, 2014b: 9-13).   
The selectivity of the values advanced by the government as composing the threatened 
national identity reinforces the political character of its discourse6 and should not come as a surprise 
given the extensive room for subjectivity provided by the Security Suspension legislation. What may 
come as a surprise for some is the acceptance and utilization of this political discourse by the judiciary, 
allowing for the successful securitization of large “development” projects and the resulting 
marginalization of tribal land claims. In deciding SL125, a decision within the Belo Monte case, Justice 
Gracie allowed herself to enter the political sphere when stating that one of the reasons why the 
project should not be halted was because this would entail the construction of other dams and 
enormous public spending. Rather than confining herself to the application of the law to the facts 
before her, the other reasons given by Justice Gracie for allowing Belo Monte to continue were 
equally problematic. She stated that a judicial decision to the contrary would invade the discretionary 
sphere of governmental decisions, as well as holding that the legislative decree that approved the 
                                                                
5
 The idea of securitization as applicable to the present scenario was adapted from Olesker’s work (see 2014: 373-375). 
6
 According to Olesker, framing something as a security matter is a political decision (see 2014: 374). 
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project without consulting the affected tribal peoples was merely programmatic and consultations 
could be held at a later stage.  
In deciding via Security Suspension to suspend the appeals court decision suspending 
construction of the Belo Monte Dam, Justice Gracie excused herself from even considering the law 
applicable to the case, which determined that consultations should be held at the planning stage of 
such projects, prior to any decisions (see ILO, 1989: arts. 6 and 15)7. By accepting the government’s 
argument that the suspension of the project would represent an invasion by the judiciary into the 
political sphere, the President of the Supreme Court disregarded the applicable laws and effectively 
suspended the government’s obligation to act within the confines of the law. Indeed, the use of this 
line of reasoning makes it difficult to see how a judge might refuse an application made under 
Security Suspension. The successful securitization of the Belo Monte project excluded tribal peoples’ 
rights and interests from the public interest, confirming their status as an existential threat to public 
order and the economy, elements on which the government’s selective idea of the constitutional 
values composing the national identity are dependent.  
At the meeting before the Commission, it was shown that the judiciary systematically accepts 
and legitimizes the governmental discourse as demonstrated above, resulting in the successful 
securitization of energy production and similar projects to the detriment of tribal peoples’ land claims 
(see AIDA et al, 2014b: 14-23). This politicization of the judiciary resulting from the utilization of 
Security Suspension and the consequent securitization here under analysis entails various violations 
of tribal peoples’ rights, perpetuating historic dynamics of repression between these peoples and the 
state as will be demonstrated in the following section. 
4. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR TRIBAL PEOPLES 
The historic oppression of tribal peoples in Brazil is well documented. Indigenous land and 
connected rights have been trampled upon to such an extent that their population has been reduced 
from 5 million to some 700,000 persons, nowadays composing only 0.43% of the Brazilian population 
(United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous Peoples: 7-8). More than 1000 languages were lost in this process (Ibid). Another minority, 
the Quilombolas, who are self-identified tribal peoples taking their denomination from the formation 
of quilombos communities of former slaves, have also historically struggled to have their traditions 
and territories recognized and respected (see Comissão Pró-Índio de São Paulo). Yet another minority, 
the Ribeirinhos are river people who to this day are not even acknowledged as tribal peoples by the 
government in spite of having developed deep connections to the territories they came to inhabit to 
the point that their cultural distinctiveness can be considered endemic (see Morin, 2014). Their 
classification as traditional communities, and not as tribal peoples, represents the continuation of a 
policy of exclusion that they have been subjected to since the first half of the twentieth century8.  
This historic pattern of oppression that results in rights violations is perpetuated and 
facilitated by the utilization of Security Suspension. The very framing by the government and 
acceptance by the judiciary of tribal land claims as an existential threat to the fundamental values of 
                                                                
7
 See ILO Convention 169 entered into force in Brazil in 19 April 2004 via Decree n. 5.051.   
8
 On the exclusion of Ribeirinhos from public policy see Morin’s work (2014). 
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the state should be considered discriminatory, as it considers these minorities’ cultural survival less 
important than the economic progress of the country. As will be discussed later in this article, the 
argument that these projects benefit the majority of the population is highly questionable. In this 
context of cultural prejudice, numerous human rights violations that are a direct and indirect 
consequence of the utilization of Security Suspension can be identified. Some of these violations are 
outlined below. 
The procedural rights violations related to due process and access to justice that were 
presented before the IACHR can be considered a direct consequence of the use of Security 
Suspension. Articles 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights and 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR), both ratified by Brazil9, clarify that 
everyone has the right to be judged by an independent, impartial and competent court (see 
Organization of the American States, 1969: art. 8; and United Nations, 1966: art. 14). As pointed out 
above, by using the instrument being discussed the government violates the right of these peoples 
to have their case heard by an impartial and independent judge or court, as the decision makers are 
expected to rule on political and subjective grounds while influenced by officials who play a decisive 
part in these judges’ career prospects.  
The right to be heard by a competent court is also directly violated by the use of Security 
Suspension. In Brazil a judge or court is assigned a case on a random basis so the parties cannot choose 
to take the case to a decision maker for his/her political or legal opinions (see AIDA et al, 2014b: 25-
26). However, as mentioned earlier, irrespective of the judge or court previously assigned to the case, 
a Security Suspension appeal is always directed at the president of a superior court, a person with no 
specific knowledge of the facts and who is called upon to suspend in a matter of minutes a detailed 
decision from a lower court or judge familiar with the case (AIDA et al, 2014b: 25-26). The right to an 
effective recourse/remedy set out in articles 25 of the ACHR and 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR is also violated 
by the use of Security Suspension. As previously outlined, the instrument allows the state to suspend, 
until a final decision on the merits, a ruling from a lower court that was directed at protecting human 
rights. In Brazil a final decision on the merits can take many years to be reached, and by the time the 
suspension of lower courts’ decisions are lifted the violations they were directed at protecting are 
already consummated, rendering these decisions ineffective (see AIDA et al, 2014b: 26-27). 
Logically, by making these protective decisions ineffective, the use of Security Suspension can 
be regarded as an indirect cause of tribal peoples’ material and procedural human rights being 
violated, as it clears the way for these violations to occur. In the case of Belo Monte, the SL125 
decision allowed the government to continue pursuing the construction of the dam without holding 
a consultation process with tribal peoples as provided for by the applicable law. Hence, the legal 
instrument was used to disregard these peoples’ procedural human right that serves as guarantor for 
the protection of rights such as self-determination, property and cultural rights10. The same pattern 
of human rights violations can be spotted in other so-called development projects that survive due 
                                                                
9
 The ICCPR was ratified by Brazil on 24 January 1992 and the ACHR on 9 July 1992. 
10
 FPIC rights are considered a guarantor of tribal peoples material human rights and a minimum core obligation of the State 
for guaranteeing the minimum acceptable of social rights (see AIDA et al, 2014a:18). 
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to the utilization of Security Suspension11. As was to be expected due to the indivisibility and 
interdependency of tribal peoples’ rights12, in Belo Monte these violations resulted in the 
deterioration of their health, water and food sources (see AIDA et al, 2014a: 14-16). The water from 
the Xingu River that indigenous peoples and Ribeirinhos use for drinking, fishing and bathing has been 
polluted to such an extent that in 2012, 9 out of 10 indigenous children had acute diarrhoea, 14% of 
these children were poorly fed and cases of intestinal parasitosis soared by 244%, all due to the 
construction of the dam (AIDA et al, 2014a: 14-16). Other judicial rulings that tried to stop the 
construction of the dam and prevent or halt these violations were also made ineffective by 
subsequent Security Suspension rulings emanating from higher courts13. The same modus operandi 
with the consequent violations is under way in the Tapajós basin and there is no reason to believe it 
will be any different elsewhere (AIDA et at, 2014b: 14-20). 
The brief analysis of the above violations that are directly or indirectly caused by the 
utilization of Security Suspension should sufficiently demonstrate how the instrument perpetuates 
and facilitates the historic patterns of oppression suffered by tribal peoples in Brazil. It perpetuates 
that oppression when these peoples’ rights are directly violated by its utilization, and it facilitates 
oppression when it curbs the effectiveness of rulings protective of their rights. It can thus be 
concluded that the Brazilian state was trying to mislead the IACHR when it affirmed that the 
instrument was key to guaranteeing democratic interests in the face of ill-advised judicial decisions – 
unless the state believes that a democracy is tantamount to the tyrannical rule of the majority, or 
worse still, the prioritization of elite interests over the human rights of some of Brazil’s most 
marginalised people. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
By analysing the origins and nature of Security Suspension and the consequences of its 
utilization to securitize so-called development projects to the detriment of tribal land claims, the 
authors conclude that it cannot be democratic values that guide those making use of the instrument. 
The instrument is a product of an undemocratic regime and its utilization directly and indirectly 
violates a plethora of tribal peoples’ human rights. On top of that, it does so by excluding cultural 
diversity as a part of the core values of the nation, designating as an existential threat the land claims 
of minorities who have been historically oppressed by the government. The securitization of 
extractive industry activities and other related projects in Brazil is part of a regional trend. One of the 
consequences of this is the exclusion of tribal peoples from the national identity and the systematic 
violation of their rights. 
Furthermore, in advancing its priority projects while trying to impose economic interest as 
the core value of Brazilian society, the government actually seems to do little for the benefit of the 
majority of the population. At a time when concerns about climate change are at its peak, the majority 
                                                                
11
 See, for example, the complex of dams in the Tapajós basin (AIDA et al, 2014b: 14-20). Rojas and Do Valle cite more examples 
(2013). 
12
 Jaichand and Sampaio see the interconnection of indigenous people’s rights as an optimal example of the indivisibility and 
interdependence of human rights (see 2013: 417). As this connection is based on the common relation all of other rights to 
these peoples land rights, it is submitted that the assertion is applicable to tribal peoples in general, and not only indigenous 
peoples. 
13
 See, for example, 1st Federal Regional Tribunal of Brazil, 2011; and STF, 2012 confirming the ultra vires effects of SL125. 
The dynamics of energy policy securitization in Brazil and the consequences for tribal peoples 15 
 
Homa Publica - Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos e Empresas | 2526-0774 | Vol. 01 Nº 01 | Jun-Nov 2016 
population would be better served by a government that respects tribal peoples’ land rights and 
works to prevent the deforestation of vast territories of the country, preserving the environment and 
biodiversity (see Bandeira, 2014). This would mean de-securitizing energy production and other so-
called development projects and adopting a new understanding of development in keeping with the 
UN Declaration on the Right to Development for the benefit of tribal peoples in Brazil and the general 
population. However, if the government's energy policy and its so-called development projects that 
entail the marginalization of tribal land claims here analysed are neither sought in the interest of the 
minority nor of the majority of the population, it is important to consider the interested parties and 
their motivations. 
Fearnside has suggested that the real beneficiaries of projects such as those discussed in this 
article are construction and consultancy firms and also the aluminum industry (Fearnside, 2006: 19). 
A recent investigation conducted in Brazil revealed that big construction companies were involved in 
one of the biggest cases of corruption faced by the country, through which 10 billion reais were 
diverted from the state-owned oil company Petrobras (El País, 2014). These companies contributed 
62% of the donations for the 2014 national elections campaign of the party in power (El País, 2014). 
in addition, 34% of the total donated to the opposition parties came from these companies (El País, 
2014). Three of these companies are a part of the consortium responsible for the construction of the 
Belo Monte Dam (Consórcio Construtor Belo Monte, 2015). So far, one of them is also involved in the 
construction projects of Tapajós (see Brasil, 2014b). With this modus operandi and with the 
substantial political power this kind of money can harness, it did not seem far-fetched to imagine that 
the real reason behind the construction of these projects in Brazil was to enrich a small niche of 
enterprises favoured by politicians that depend on such companies to remain in power.  This dynamic 
has been noted by the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights in the following terms: 
45. The Working Group also noted concerns about undue corporate influence on regulatory 
and policymaking processes and that the Government’s capability to oversee business 
operations may, in some cases, be affected by political financing processes and corporate 
lobbying. 46 Such perceptions have been exacerbated by a series of corruption scandals 
involving major companies and elected politicians. (United Nations Working Group on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 2016, 
p. 13 § 45) 
Confirming that the said concerns are justified, Senator Delcídio do Amaral, who was arrested 
for obstruction of justice during the abovementioned investigations, blew the whistle on the real 
dynamics behind these projects. In the case of Belo Monte, the Senator affirmed that by irregularly 
favouring national companies to construct and provide equipment to the project, 15 to 20 million 
reais were illegally provided by these companies to finance the elections of PT and PMDB political 
parties’ members (see Época 2016) – the parties from suspended President Dilma Rousseff (PT), from 
President in exercise Michel Temer (PMDB), from suspended president of the Chamber of Deputies 
Eduardo Cunha (PMDB) and from president of the Senate Renan Calheiros (PMDB). For as long as 
Security Suspension exists and allows those in power to act outside of the confines of the law by 
securitizing energy production and whatever else they decide meets their definition of development, 
it is the entire Brazilian society that will pay the price as their social democratic constitutional values 
are sabotaged and manipulated to the detriment of historically marginalized tribal peoples and their 
land rights.  
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